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1. Introduction 
 
Korea and Japan have developed similar institutions in the labor market. A 
dismissal without a just cause is strictly banned by the provisions and rules of EPL 
(Employment Protection Legislation). Internal labor market and the HRM practices 
such as worker-based (not job-based) management system and seniority-based wages 
look similar in appearance between Korean firms and Japanese firms. However, labor 
market outcomes from the two countries are quite different.  
Japanese firms are commonly known to have a stronger internal labor market 
system than Korean counterparts, in which a lifetime employment is ensured for all 
incumbents and seniority-based wages and promotion system is still working. 
Nonetheless, the insider-outsider problem in Japanese labor market does not attract 
public attention as much as in Korean labor market. What makes the differences? How 
Japanese firms are balancing the required flexibility and the rigidity of internal labor 
market?  
We believe that a matter of concern is not an each practice itself but the way of 
combining the individual practices. This paper focuses especially on the relationship 
between the wage structure and skill formation of workers and clarifies the similarities 
and differences in HRM practices between in Korean firms and in Japanese firms. From 
the comparisons, we try to find policy implications for Korean labor market. 
 
2. The Dual Structure of Korean Labor Market  
 
Bipolarization in the labor market is currently the one of the hottest issues in 
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Korea. Evidences of polarization in the Korean labor market are observed in the various 
dimensions such as large/small company, regular/non-regular work, union/nonunion 
sector. 
In 2005, 37.7% of male and 61.8% of female wage earners have a temporary or 
daily job position (Table 1) and the wage level of non-regular workers does not reach at 
60% level of regular workers (National Statistical Office, Economically Active 
Population Survey). As the wage differentials between large and small company has 
been enlarged, the relative wages of workers in small firms with 10-29 employees to 
their counterparts in large firms with 500 or more employees dropped from 74% in 1990 
to 58% in 2004. Compared to the trend of the 1990s that moderately decreased at the 
70% level, a rapid decline of relative wages appears over the 2000s (Figure 1). In the 
meantime, the coverage of labor union shrunk to less than 11%, moreover, it is so 
overrepresented by large companies that 2/3 of union members belong to large company 
with 1,000 or more employees that being no more than 5.3% of the whole employees 
(Ministry of Labor, 2004). 
 
Table 1. Employment Structure in Korea        (unit: thousand person, %) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Male 6,759  7,975  7,963  8,794  
 Regular 4,361 ( 64.5) 5,392 ( 67.6) 4,716 ( 59.2) 5,479 ( 62.3)
 Temporary 1,512 ( 22.4) 1,595 ( 20.0) 2,112 ( 26.5) 2,182 ( 24.8)
 Daily 886 ( 13.1) 987 ( 12.4) 1,135 ( 14.3) 1,134 ( 12.9)
Female 4,190  4,924  5,397  6,391  
 Regular 1,577 ( 37.6) 2,107 ( 42.8) 1,679 ( 31.1) 2,439 ( 38.2)
 Temporary 1,659 ( 39.6) 2,003 ( 40.7) 2,496 ( 46.2) 2,874 ( 45.0)
 Daily 954 ( 22.8) 814 ( 16.5) 1,222 ( 22.6) 1,079 ( 16.9)
Source: National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey 
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Figure 1. Wage Differentials between Large and Small Company  
(500 or more employees=100) 
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Source: Ministry of Labor, Monthly Labor Statistics Survey, each year. 
 
While the regular workers in large companies enjoy the privileged positions with 
higher wages, employment security and strong bargaining power, the workers who work 
for small companies or non-regular jobs have to endure unfavorable employment 
opportunities such as lower wages and employment insecurity without any protection. 
The former can be regarded as the “insiders” and the latter as the “outsiders” in Korean 
labor market in the sense that the former has some market power to set their wages 
whereas the latter is completely competitive (Lindbeck & Snower, 1986, 1988).  
The insiders’ labor market in Korea takes a traditional internal labor market 
system that cultivates long-term loyalty and attachment from employees by providing 
job security and various seniority-based HRM practices, where the object of 
management is the “workers” who belong to the organization. On the other hand, the 
outsiders’ labor market in Korea seems one that an entry and an exit of workers occur 
frequently and a job-based compensation system dominates. In other words, the “jobs” 
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that firms possess are the direct object of management. In this context, the HRM system 
of the insiders’ labor market is similar to Japanese HRM practices and that of the 
outsiders’ labor market to the HRM practices of United States. 
The initial formation of internal labor market in Korea is said to date from the 
period of industrialization in 1970s after the model of Japan. However it was restricted 
within some of white collar workers until the early 1980s. Taking advantage of 
democratization after the later 1980s, internal labor market system spread to all blue 
collar workers in large company and furthermore, a demand for living wages and a 
single wage table system strengthened the seniority feature of wages. Putting the brake 
on employer’s tyranny, labor unions have exercised a strong influence over job transfers 
and rotations as well as wages. On the contrary to the world’s trend to increase 
flexibility over the 1990s, the internal labor market in Korea turned to reinforce wage 
rigidity and functional rigidity. 
The Asian economic crisis in 1997-1998 has given a profound impact in HRM in 
Korean firms. After the economic crisis, many Korean firms have been forced to reduce 
their workforce: 66% of listed companies are reported to lay-off their workforce (Korea 
Labor Institute, 2000). And they learned an important lesson to increase the flexibility in 
managing their workforce, which was not a consideration in the growth era before. On 
the employees’ side, this (direct or indirect) lay-off experience has changed their attitude 
vis-à-vis the company: the tie between company and employees become loose and the 
interest in the short term become more important. Employees’ demands inclined to get 
more wages on the spot before they laid-off rather than to invest on career development 
for the long term opportunities. These changes in both sides have given a strong shock 
to the traditional Korean HRM system. 
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Without any other options of increasing flexibility inside internal labor market, 
many Korean firms chose the numerical flexibility, that is, the “externalization of 
employment relationship.” When firms pursue the numerical flexibility rather than the 
wage flexibility or functional flexibility, the problem may originated is that the rigidity 
and inefficiency of internal labor market remains unsolved and the internal labor market 
gradually being closed down and replaced by external market. As a result, non-protected, 
nonregular workers will increase. Figure 2 illustrates this procedure in internal labor 
market system. 
 
Figure 2.  Externalization of employment and the change in internal labor market 
 
 
In KLI survey, it is reported the proportion of the “insiders” fell from 27.5% in 
1998 to 21.9% in 2004, and the relative wage ratio of the “outsiders” to the “insiders” 
diminished from 62.5% to 56.8% during the same period (Table 2 and Figure 3). The 
disparity between two groups – insiders and outsiders – has been deepened and profound, 
so as to become an important source of social exclusion. 
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Table 2. Proportion of Insiders and Relative Wage Ratio of Outsiders 
 (unit : %) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
[Employment share]        
Large company 33.0 31.6 30.6 27.4 26.3 27.9 27.1 
Union sector 23.4 19.8 21.2 19.5 18.2 19.5 19.3 
Regular workers 69.4 65.2 72.2 69.0 68.5 65.3 67.4 
Insiders 27.5 24.4 25.0 22.4 21.7 22.5 21.9 
[Wage rate]        
Midium & Small/Large 67.8 69.3 70.7 68.3 63.9 60.9 61.1 
Nonunion/Union 76.2 67.7 69.3 71.9 65.7 62.7 59.3 
Nonregular/Regular 60.7 59.3 62.9 62.3 63.4 61.7 56.7 
Outsiders/Insiders 62.5 61.5 65.3 63.2 59.9 58.4 56.8 
Note: 1. “Large company” means the company with 300 or more employees or public sector. 
 2. “Insiders” include regular workers in large company with 300 or more employees or public 
sector.  
Source: KLI, Korea Labor & Income Panel Study, the 7th wave (2005). 
 
Figure 3. Insiders and Outsiders in Korean Labor Market 
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Note: “Insiders” include regular workers in large company with 300 or more employees or public sector.  
Source: KLI, Korea Labor & Income Panel Study, the 7th wave (2005). 
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3. Comparison of Internal Labor Market in Korea and Japan  
 
Internal labor market implies workers have careers inside organizations, which 
departs from standard conceptions of competitive labor markets. In many cases, it may 
show inconsistency with traditional economic theories of labor markets. From 1970s, 
many economists beginning with Doeringer and Piore described these aspects of 
internal labor markets (such as ports of entry and wages attached to jobs) that depart 
from standard conceptions of competitive labor markets. More recently, personnel 
economists headed by E. P Lazear have analyzed wage and promotion dynamics inside 
firms and provided detailed empirical analyses of careers inside specific firms, which in 
order to find the reasoning of internal labor market. Now internal labor markets are 
considered as another factory that determines wage structure and skill development. 
Japanese internal labor market is often portrayed as the typical corporate body of 
long-term contract, firm-specific skills, and seniority wages. This section investigates 
the aspects of internal labor market in Korea and compares with the case of Japan.  
 
1) Long-term employment 
 
Japan is well known as the country that highly developed internal labor market 
system. Japanese internal labor market is often illustrated by long-term employment and 
seniority rules in wage determination and promotions.  
As of 2004, the average length of service of male workers in Japan is 13.4 years 
for all industries and 15.5 years for manufacturing sector (Table 3). Although Korea is 
also known to have similar institutions inside firms, the average length of service of 
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male workers is far shorter than those of Japan. The figures were respectively 6.9 years 
and 7.2 years in 2004. There may exist time difference between two countries according 
to the stage of industrialization. Considering that the current average age of Korean 
workers is similar to that of 1990 in Japan, it will be useful to compare 2004 of Korea 
with 1990 of Japan. However, Korean workers’ job tenure is still shorter than Japanese’ 
one, which was 12.5 years for all industries and 13.8 years for manufacturing sector.  
Then, does not Korea have a long term employment structure? We can find the 
answer partly from the discrepancy by firm size. Considering that the categorization of 
large company is slightly different between two countries, the gap in the length of 
tenure is not so obvious for large company. However, for middle and small company, 
there exist sharp differences in workers’ job tenure. 
 
Table 3. Average job tenure and age by firm size in Korea and Japan (Male only)  
          (unit: year) 
  Average length of tenure  Average Age 
Japan  Total 1000+ 100-999 10-99 Total 1000+ 100-999 10-99 
-1990-                 
All Industries 12.5 15.8 11.9 10.0 39.5 38.7 38.7 41.0 
Manufacturing 13.8 16.7 13.0 11.0 39.4 38.5 38.3 41.9 
-2004-                 
All Industries 13.4 16.8 13.0 11.1 41.3 40.8 40.8 42.3 
Manufacturing 15.5 19.1 15.0 12.2 41.1 41.1 40.1 42.5 
Korea  Total 500+ 100-499 10-99 Total 500+ 100-499 10-99 
-1990-            
All Industries 5.1 6.5 5.2 4.1 34.8 33.9 35.3 35.0 
Manufacturing 4.7 6.3 4.9 3.0 33.3 32.9 33.3 33.7 
-2004-            
All Industries 6.9 10.3 7.5 5.5 39.4 38.3 39.7 39.6 
Manufacturing 7.2 11.3 7.9 4.7 37.5 37.4 36.6 38.0 
Source: Korea. Ministry of Labor, Basic Survey on Wage Structure, 1990 & 2004 
Japan. Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Basic Survey on Wage Structure, 1990 & 2004 
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Table 4 shows other measures of job tenure of workers in Korea and Japan; the 
employment share of short-term workers with tenure of less than 1 year (or 3 years) and 
the employment share of long-term workers with tenure of over 15 years. As expected, 
the share of short-term workers is higher in Korean firms and the share of long-term 
workers is lower in Korean firms than Japanese counterparts. However, in the same 
manner, there exists striking contrast between large company and small company.  
In other words, while the long-term employment practice spreads over all 
Japanese companies regardless of firm size, it is restricted only within large companies 
in Korea. 
 
Table 4. Job tenure Comparisons in Korea and Japan (2004, Male only) 
 (unit: %) 
 
Percentage of workers 
with a tenure of less than 
1 year 
Percentage of workers 
with a tenure of less than 
3 years 
Percentage of workers 
with a tenure of over 15 
years 
Japan Total 1000+ 100 -999 10-99 Total 1000+
100 
-999 10-99 Total 1000+ 
100 
-999 10-99
All Industry 6.8 4.2 7.1 8.8 18.9 11.8 19.5 24.2 37.0 49.7 35.5 28.1
Manufacturing 5.2 2.6 5.4 7.8 14.0 7.6 14.0 20.9 44.3 57.5 42.5 32.3
Korea Total 500+ 100 -499 10-99 Total 500+
100 
-499 10-99 Total 500+ 
100 
-499 10-99
All Industry 17.7 10.1 14.2 21.7 39.6 23.5 34.1 47.4 14.5 29.9 15.2 9.1
Manufacturing 16.8 9.0 12.8 22.8 38.0 19.7 32.4 50.1 16.2 35.8 17.6 5.6
Source: Same as Table 3. 
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2) Seniority wages  
 
Most regular workers in Korea are paid according to a seniority–based wage 
schedule like workers in Japan, which awards compensation according to their job 
tenure not to their performance. In Korea, this seniority–based wage system is regarded 
as the most important source that makes internal labor market more rigid. For instance, 
most Korean firms have the wage table called as a “hobong” table, which fixes the base 
wage of workers according to the rank given by one’s seniority. Therefore, it can be 
virtually true that a major portion of compensation is settled down at the point of time 
when workers entered the firm regardless of their current outcomes.  
Now let us think about seniority wages in general. It is known as that wages 
generally increase with seniority. This feature is observed not only in the countries with 
seniority-based compensation system but also in the countries with job-based 
compensation system. There are three approaches to explain the aspects of internal labor 
market; those are job assignment, human-capital acquisition, and learning approach. Job 
assignment approach assumes that jobs are ranked in terms of the importance of ability, 
so it is efficient to assign higher-ability workers to higher levels of the job ladder (Rosen, 
1982; Waldman, 1984). Human capital approach assumes that a worker’s productivity 
rises during the worker’s career (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1974). Learning approach 
assumes that there is uncertainty about a worker’s ability at the beginning, but all firms 
learn about the worker’s ability from output observations as the worker ages (Harris & 
Holmstrom, 1982; Farber & Gibbons, 1996). These views give us insights in 
understanding aspects of seniority wages from each different angle, respectively job, 
worker, and employer.  
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If we want to focus on internal labor market, the most pervasive explanation is 
that human capital accumulates as seniority increases and wages reflect rewards for 
augmented human capital. The question at issue, however, is the structure and the slope 
of wage profile over lifetime. It may correspond exactly to the extent of reflecting the 
increase of productivity or may not.  
One explanation for the discrepancy between wages and productivity on the spot 
is that wages are deferred for incentive or long-term insurance contracts. The deferred 
payment explanation is naturally accepted for the case of Japanese internal labor market 
because workers’ wages in Japanese company increase gradually and steady during the 
whole lifetime. That means the age-wage profile in cross sectional analysis takes the 
upward sloping shape until age 50s. However, this explanation can be somehow 
inadequate for the country in which long-term employment practice does not prevail or 
the increase rate of wages overwhelms that of productivity from the beginning. The 
former may reflect more competitive nature and the latter monopolistic rent-seeking.  
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the age-wage profiles in manufacturing sector in 
Korea and Japan. We separates production workers and managerial and office workers. 
As compared with Japan, several distinctions are observed in wage profiles in 
Korea. First, the wage-profile of production workers differs from that of managerial and 
office workers in Korea, contrary to Japan. The wage profile of Korean production 
workers have an inverse U-shaped with peak at age 40s, while the wage profile of 
Korean managerial/office workers increases monotonously over lifetime. In Japan, none 
the less for different slopes and different peaks, both profiles are basically similar in 
shape. It may be connected with career paths of them in both countries. This topic will 
be dealt in the next section. 
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Figure 4. Changes in age-wage profile in Korean manufacturing sector (Male only) 
A. Production worker 
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Figure 5. Changes in age-wage profile in Japanese manufacturing sector (Male only) 
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B. Managerial and office worker 
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Second, the slopes of wage profiles in Korea are steeper than those in Japan all 
through the period until they reach the peak. In particular, for Korean production 
workers, wages in early stage increases very fast as age increases, and once it reaches a 
certain level at age 40-44 it stays at that level during age 40s, and then it falls drastically 
after age 50. In the case of Japan, wages of production workers increase until age 50s as 
same as managerial/office workers. It is however noteworthy that wages of production 
workers in large company in Korea stays at the highest level until age 50s, which is 
similar to Japanese workers (See Appendix Figure A2). 
Third, the slopes of wage profiles in Korea have been changed steeper overtime in 
contrast to the case of Japan. What is more, its increase range became larger especially 
after 1996. As workers’ expectation on lifetime employment has collapsed passing 
through the economic crisis, workers showed a strong tendency to lean myopic interests 
rather than long-run interests. Regardless of their intention, however, the consequences 
ware that it makes the employment security of middle-aged workers worse due to high 
labor costs of employing them. In order to alleviate labor costs, Firms commenced mass 
layoff aiming at middle-and-old-aged workers. High-cost structure of employing 
middle-and-old-aged workers is still a major hindrance in managing of workforce aging 
in Korean society.  
In Japan, on the contrary, it is found that the slope of profiles decreases and the 
peak age moves out over time. These changes can be relevant to the effort to extend the 
retirement age of workers under the framework of deferred payment (See Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. The slope of seniority wages and retirement age 
 
 
 
3) Career and skill development  
 
Developing career is an important element of employee development. Career 
development is not a one-shot training program. Rather, it is an ongoing organized and 
formalized effort that recognizes people as vital organizational resources. In 1995, 
career development is implemented in 23.4% of Korean large firms employing more 
than 300 persons (Ahn, 1996), and there is no change in this rate in the survey of 2000. 
For the case of production workers, the rate will decrease furthermore. The limited use 
of career development seems to be related to the weakening long-term employment 
practice and internal labor market. 
Koike (1987) claimed that the most remarkable feature of Japanese internal labor 
market is that wages for all workers including production workers rise with age similar 
to white collar workers in the United States. The rationale is that production workers in 
Japan are trained to acquire “intellectual skills,” which imply the know-how to cope 
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with changes and to solve unusual problems, through work practices in the plant-level. 
According to Koike’s argument, internal labor market in Japan can be said to succeed in 
operating skill development system for production workers as well as providing them 
seniority wages. This balance makes Japanese HRM practices to meet not only the 
security criterion but also the productivity (or flexibility) criterion.  
Recently, Shibata (1999) reinterprets Japanese work practices focusing on the role 
of supervisors in Japanese firm. He argues that integrated skills, middle-up-down 
decision making, and an informal and one-channel conflict settlement procedure are the 
unique components of the practices in Japanese plants. On the contrary, in American 
plants, it is said that separated skills, self-managing teams, and the dual conflict 
settlement procedure are prevalent. According to his research, in Japanese plants, the 
persons who are responsible for plant-level skill management such as job rotations and 
transfers are the assistant and first-line supervisors. The plant-level skill management 
such as job rotations and transfers decisively affect workers’ integrated skills formation. 
They evaluate each worker’s skill level and make a decision to post “right person in the 
right place.” With respect to workplace communication, they lead semiautonomous 
work teams and execute middle-up-down decision making.  
According to the survey of Shibata (1999), the assistant and first-line supervisors 
are aged over the late 30s and the early 40s, respectively (Table 5). And they occupy 
13.5% of whole workers in the plants.  
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Table 5. Numbers of Supervisors in 3 Japanese Plants, surveyed by Shibata (1999) 
 
 
Using the ‘Basic Survey on Wage Structure’, we can get more general information 
on characteristics of supervisors in Japanese company. According to the results, on 
average, 7-10 supervisors per 100 workers are arranged in Japanese workplaces and the 
ratio is higher in large company with 1000 or more employees (Appendix Table A1). 
The supervisors consist of workers who have worked on average more than 20 years as 
production workers, and their average age is 44. The status and the role of supervisors 
may become a key factor to understand the conformity of long-term career development 
and seniority wage system in the Japanese HRM practices. 
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4. Discussion 
 
Skill development plays an important role in developing an individual’s career, in 
enhancing corporate competitiveness, and in promoting economic development. 
Developing the skill and competency of a worker not only contributes towards 
employment security and higher income but also enables enterprises to secure and foster 
human resources needed to maintain their competitive edge. Moreover, the effective 
development, utilization, and allocation of human resources can catalyze economic 
development beyond what is normally permitted by the limited amount of physical 
resources. 
Recently universal environmental pressure, especially globalization and 
borderless market competition, led firms to change their HRM practices toward getting 
more competitive advantage, which aims more flexibility in the workplace. Such 
changes can be fundamental change or just extensions of the basic framework.  
The traditional Korean HRM system has been defined as one that cultivates 
long-term loyalty and organizational attachment from employees by providing job 
security and various seniority-based HRM practices. It is clear that the universal 
environmental pressure, traditional HRM practices and perspectives of Korean firms are 
not very effective anymore. The new direction of HRM practices and perspectives is the 
one that gives firms more flexibility of the workplace and the one that emphasizes more 
performance from employees. Korea, however, does not seem successful in grafting the 
flexibility into internal labor market, which results in the dual structure of Korean labor 
market. The rigidity of internal labor market still remains as it was or even worse.  
We have discussed the similarities and differences in wage structure and skill 
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development between Korea and Japan. It seems clear that Japanese firms are 
successfully managed enough to meet security criterion and flexibility criterion than 
Korean firms. However, the direct transformation of Japanese HRM practices will be 
not easy and not desirable since each institution in different countries embodies each 
country’s different cultural settings. The most important thing is to have new 
perspective of HRM practices in Korea. And, it may be to make existing internal labor 
market become healthy and well-functioning by means of functional flexibility and 
wage flexibility.  
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Appendix  
Figure A1. Trends of Wage Differentials by firm size in Korea and Japan 
    (500 or more employees=100) 
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Figure A2. Age-wage profiles by firm size in Korea 
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Figure A3. Workers’ composition by workers’ type in manufacturing sector in Korea 
and Japan 
<Korea> 
      a. Production workers    b. Managerial/office workers 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
-19 20-
24
25-
29
30-
34
35-
39
40-
44
45-
49
50-
54
55-
59
60-
64
65+
1990 1996 2004
 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
-19 20-
24
25-
29
30-
34
35-
39
40-
44
45-
49
50-
54
55-
59
60-
64
65+
1990 1996 2004
 
<Japan> 
      c. Production workers    d. Managerial/office workers 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
-19 20-
24
25-
29
30-
34
35-
39
40-
44
45-
49
50-
54
55-
59
60-
64
65+
1985 1995 2004
 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
-19 20-
24
25-
29
30-
34
35-
39
40-
44
45-
49
50-
54
55-
59
60-
64
65+
1985 1995 2004
 
  
25
Table A1. Workers’ Composition by Class of Position (2004) 
(unit: %) 
 Department 
Manager 
Section 
Manager Chief Supervisor Workers 
All 4 11 10 8 100 
1000+ 4 11 10 10 100 
500-999 4 11 10 7 100 
100-499 5 11 10 7 100 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Basic Survey on Wage Structure, 2004 
 
Table A2. Average Age and Job Tenure by Class of position (2004) 
(unit: years) 
  Department Manager 
Section 
Manager Chief Supervisor Workers 
All 25.7 23.2 20.3 22.3 14.9 
1000+ 27.6 24.1 21.8 25.3 17.2 
500-999 26.7 24.2 20.2 20.5 14.6 
Job 
Tenure 
100-499 23.6 21.8 18.6 18.3 12.2 
All 52.2 47.5 43.3 43.6 38.3 
1000+ 51.8 47.3 43.7 44.8 39.0 
500-999 52.4 47.9 43.3 42.3 38.0 
Age 
100-499 52.4 47.7 42.9 42.3 37.7 
Source: Same as Table 6. 
 
Table A3. Relative Level of Wages by Class of Position (2004)  
(Workers =100) 
  Department 
Manager 
Section 
Manager Chief Foreman Workers 
All 206 168 128 119 100 
1000+ 213 173 129 119 100 
500-999 211 167 128 112 100 
100-499 202 164 128 116 100 
Source: Same as Table 6. 
 
